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Philosophical research will have to dispense with the 
"philosophy of language" if it is to inquire into "the 
things themselves" and attain the status of a 
problematic which has been cleared up 
conceptually. (Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 209-
210.) 
How curious, that stating is to be a laying. Do we 
intend with this reference to shake the foundation of 
all philology and philosophy of language, and to 
expose them as sham [Schein]? Indeed we do. 
(Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 200.) 
Two facts about Heidegger's published works invite an 
effort to understand and explain the negative opinion of the 
philosophy of language the undeveloped, critical remarks 
above indicate. First, there is not to be found in Heidegger's 
published works any systematic critique of philosophy of 
language as such. Second, despite the large number of his 
essays on language, it cannot be said that there is a developed 
Heideggarian philosophy of language, at least in any ordinary 
sense of that phrase. Such an attempt can be neither a mere 
exposition nor a simple derivation or deduction. It must rather 
be a restricted speculative construction, one that is alert to 
certain features of philosophy of language, on the one hand, 
and that does not violate either the letter or the spirit of 
Heidegger's thought, on the other. I shall attempt here such a 
constructive exploration of why Heidegger had the negative 
opinion of the philosophy of language the above quotations 
indicate. 
I shall proceed by (1) sketching a general characterization 
of philosophy of language by focusing on what philosophers of 
language typically take as their subject matter, their typical 
means of access to it, and what they typically seek to 
accomplish; (2) in the spirit of Heidegger's thought. 
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constructing an initial account of the limitations in these; (3) 
exploring the alternatives to them found in and suggested by 
Heidegger's later essays on language, (4) adding to (2) in light 
of (3); and (5) in light of these, offering a few general 
observations about the condition the philosophy of language is 
left in. 
I. 
Heidegger's negative opinion of the philosophy of 
language rests, I believe, not on the specific details of any 
particular philosophy of language but on certain typical 
orientations to language which prevade the whole domain and 
which have become basic, largely unquestioned assumptions in 
it. These typical orientations and unquestioned assumptions are 
what must be reviewed first. They must be reviewed with an 
eye toward what Heidegger's texts permit us to conclude to be 
the reasons behind his negative opinion, and they must be 
reviewed briefly. 
One clear tendency among philosophers of language has 
been to objectify language, i.e., to base ideas about language in 
what appears when one looks at what has been or is imagined 
to be the speaking—broadly construed—of a particular 
language. In the phrase "philosophy of language," the "of" is 
ordinarily construed as an objective genitive. That is, language 
is taken as an already-constituted item or object to be 
interrogated philosophically. The means of access to the 
subject matter of the philosophy of language and the subject 
matter itself are inseparable. P. F. Strawson put it most 
succinctly when he wrote, "we understand nothing of human 
language unless we understand human speech."1 
The prevailing ideas about language in the philosophy of 
language are almost always, if not exclusively, based on certain 
features of human speech. For example, since speaking is 
obviously a human activity, language must be a product of 
creative intellectual effort, a product of mind, or perhaps an 
example of constitutive rules of behavior. 
*P. F. Strawson, "Meaning and Truth," in The Philosophy of Language, 
edited by A. P. Martinich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 
111. 
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In order to think about language as it appears in speaking, a 
technical vocabulary—what 1 call, recognizing its deviance 
from common usage, a metalanguage—has been created. The 
metalanguage of the philosophy of language includes but is not 
limited to such words as: assertion, proposition, sentence, 
semantics, syntax, grammar, denotation, connotation, sense, 
reference, speech act, performative, constative, truth-value, 
etc. 
What it means to interrogate language philosophically 
varies from philosopher to philosopher, but in the main it has 
meant formulating a general theory of language or of the 
features that all natural languages have in common. 2 
Formulating a general theory of language in turn has meant 
explaining language as it appears in actual or imagined acts of 
speaking in terms of (i.e., subordinating it to, assigning it to) 
something internal that externalizes itself in acts of speaking, 
something like constitutive rules of behavior, intentionality, 
mind, or intellect. 
So, on one side of the "of" in "philosophy of language," 
there is language as objectified, actually or potentially 
comprehensible speech acts. On the other, there is philosophy 
as an attempt to explain theoretically this appearance of 
language in terms of other things or to formulate the features 
that all natural languages have in common. 
It can of course be objected that the main interest or 
importance of philosophy of language is not merely reducible to 
speech act theory or philosophy of mind. It can be pointed out -
with reference to Plato, Russell, and Quine, for example—that 
the main philosophical interest in language is ontological, 
meaning that language is a window onto or grip on the world, 
and that this explains the preoccupation with reference among 
philosophers of language. 
We can summarize this brief characterization of the 
philosophy of language by saying that philosophers of 
language typically objectify language, that their 
objectification of it has necessitated a metalanguage, that 
their goal has been a theory of language, that certain features 
of human speech have become issues in philosophy of language. 
^ f . , jerrold J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1966), p. X. 
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that philosophy of language has been subordinated to other 
"philosophical" domains, and that there is a possibility that 
philosophy of language is basically ontological. Let us assume 
that this characterization of the philosophy of langauge is 
widely, even if not universally, acceptable. 
II . 
Although Heidegger, as I have said, never articulated an 
explicit, detailed criticism of any philosophy of language, the 
spirit of his way of thinking allows for the construction of a 
Heideggerian critique of these basics of philosophy of 
language. To begin with, such a critique relates (1) to the 
subject matter itself (language), (2) to saying something about 
the subject matter, and (3) to the goals of the philosophers of 
language. There will be more later, after we review 
Heidegger's alternative approach. 
Let us first be clear that there is no quarrel with the fact 
that in some respects language does lend itself to, even invites, 
objectification. Extant written texts and present and 
remembered instances of speaking and writing can surely be 
viewed as objects in a world of objects. Moreover, imagined 
variations on these, although not actually objects in the world, 
can be treated as if they were. But is there not always more, is 
there not always an excess, to language that does not come to 
view in such objectifying? Heidegger thought there is. In "The 
Age of the World Picture" he wrote, "Where anything that is 
has become an object of representing, it first incurs in a certain 
manner a loss of Being."3 To see the relevance of this quotation 
3Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1977), p. 142. Hereafter QT. In addition to this abbreviation, the 
following abbreviations will be used in the remainder of my paper: 
BT: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
OTB: On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper 
& Row, Publishers, 1972), 
OWL: Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans, Peter D. 
Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), 
PLT: Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert 
Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), 
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to his opinion of the philosophy of language, it is necessary to 
look into his opinion of thinking which objectifies. 
In "Science and Reflection," Heidegger articulated what he 
took to be some limitations in thinking which objectifies, the 
sort of thinking he thought generally characteristic of the 
modern age and specifically characteristic of scientific ways of 
thinking. His articulation of its limitations rested on a 
distinction between what he called that which presences and 
the modern, scientific objectification of it, which he called 
Gegenstdndigkeit (objectness). He admitted that Gegen-
stdndigkeit is a possible character belonging to that which 
presences, one produced when we. as he put it, "look attentively 
on the outward appearance wherein what presences becomes 
visible . . . ." (QT, p. 163). The distinctive feature of 
objectification and the one that produces objectness is this: 
"that which is to be grasped by the eye makes itself normative 
in knowing" (QT, p. 166). Only in terms of the Gegenstdndigkeit 
of that which presences is anything like theory possible. 
Heidegger believed, however, that there is always more to 
that which presences than can be captured in objectification, 
more than its possible objectness manifests. About language, as 
something which presences, he wrote: 
[It] holds sway as that which is not to be gotten 
around [and] that which, in the fullness of its coming 
to presence, they [the theoretical, objectifying 
sciences, including philosophy of language] can 
never encompass by means of their representing. 
(QT, pp. 175-76) 
In "Science and Reflection" he did not elaborate on this remark. 
Perhaps he had something like the following in mind. 
Objectification is limited by the viewing capacity of the 
observer. The myriad, ever-changing interests and concerns to 
which a particular language lends itself and the more than two 
thousand languages known, however, would in themselves seem 
to preclude a complete and total objectification of language 
PT: Martin Heidegger, The Piety of Thinking, trans, James G. Hart and 
John C. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 
WCT: What Is Called Thinking?, trans, J. Glenn Gray and F. Wieck 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968). 
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itself. Moreover, insofar as all language is historical, the 
objectification of language itself at any particular time imposes 
a stasis in an historically fluid phenomenon. The "loss of 
Being" incurred when it becomes the object of representing 
means restriction of a genuinely historical manifold to what 
has been spoken or imagined to have been spoken in a particular 
language, i.e., its external appearance at any given time. It 
cannot be uncritically assumed that such a restriction, implicit 
in the dominating reign of objectifying thinking, captures what 
is essential about language itself, since, as Heidegger put it, 
"objectness . . . remains only one kind of presencing, in which 
indeed that which presences can appear, but never absolutely 
must appear" (QT, p. 176). 
We turn now to the prospects inherent in saying something 
about language. Speaking about language is a particular way of 
speaking a language. Speaking about language turns language 
on itself. As I mentioned above, to turn language on itself, 
philosophers of language have employed a metalanguage that 
includes words like: assertion, proposition, semantics, syntax, 
and truth-value. In the philosophy of language, the state of 
such a metalanguage at any given time is limited to and built 
upon the objectification of language, upon certain features of its 
external appearance in acts or imagined acts of speaking. 
If, however, GegenstSndigkeit (objectness) is only one way 
language's presencing can appear, then the metalanguage 
employed to speak about it can only reflect certain features of 
one way language's presencing can appear. At best, language 
can be only partially captured in the objectifying metalanguage 
of the philosophy of language. Since language, like everything 
else, remains ever more than can be totally objectified and ever 
more than any objectively oriented metalanguage can capture, 
the conclusion imposes itself that 
the essential nature of language flatly refuses to 
express itself in words—in the language, that is, in 
which we make statements about language. If 
language everywhere withholds its nature in this 
sense, then such withholding is in the very nature of 
language. (OWL, p. 81) 
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There remains something about language and about speaking a 
language that slips through the net of, that withholds itself 
from, the metalanguage of objectification—something that 
remains elusive, fugitive. And an even more brutal conclusion 
suggests itself: "we cannot know the nature of language—know 
it according to the traditional concept of knowledge defined in 
terms of cognition as representation " (OWL, p. 134). 
We turn now in our initial review of the justification for 
Heidegger's negative opinion of the philosophy of language 
finally to the goals of philosophers of language. As 1 
mentioned above, philosophers of language typically take as 
their goals the formulating of a general theory of language or of 
the features that all natural languages have in common. In 
practice this has meant explaining language, as objectified, in 
terms of intentionality, mind, intellect, constitutive rules of 
behavior, etc. That in terms of which language is explained is 
a function or product of how language is taken to appear in the 
first place. Since the subject matter of philosophy of language 
is language's external appearance in human speaking, certain 
characteristics of speaking are also associated with language, 
and philosophers of language find it easy to subordinate 
philosophy of language to philosophy of mind, philosophy of 
action, philosophy of man, etc., only because human speaking 
indicates presence of mind, is a human act, etc. 
The problem with such a subordination relates to a problem 
with the way speaking and language are taken to be related to 
each other. We can think of it in terms of figure and ground. If 
we take speaking as the ground and language as the figure, as 
philosophers of language typically do, then it is reasonable to 
associate language with certain characteristics of speaking and 
to subordinate philosophy of language to or subsume it under 
philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, etc. Such a close 
association, even identification of language with certain 
characteristics of human speaking will, however, "never bring 
us to language as language" (PLT, p. 193). And if we have not 
been "brought" to language as language, how can any theory we 
formulate about it be taken seriously? Obviously it can't. 
Heidegger, as we shall see in the next section, seems to suggest 
that we should reverse the figure and ground relationship, i.e., 
take language as the ground and speech as the figure. Coming 
to terms with language as language will in fact demand it. 
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So on the basis of Heidegger's general objections to the 
objective orientation of traditional philosophical thinking, 
including present-day philosophy of language, we have gained 
some initial insights into why he held the negative opinion of 
the philosophy of language the quotations with which we 
began indicate. In the briefest of terms, the problem is that 
philosophy of language has characteristically been reductive 
in a twofold manner. It has reduced language to its objective 
appearance in acts of speaking, and it has reduced philosophy 
of language to a branch of act theory or philosophy of mind or 
some other philosophical interest. It has focused on language 
as an extemalization of something internal, as human activity, 
as rule governed behavior, as mirror of mind, etc., but not on 
language as language. To get beyond these initial insights, it 
will be necessary to look into certain salient features of 
Heidegger's mature reflections on language and to follow up on 
certain suggestions found in them. 
III. 
To acquire the right orientation into Heidegger's mature 
reflections on language, let us begin with a surprising fact that, 
taken on face value, might seem to nullify my whole effort: 
Heidegger was largely willing to admit the correctness of some 
of the prevailing views about language in the philosophy of 
language. "No one would dare to declare incorrect," he wrote, 
"let alone reject as useless, the identification of language as 
audible utterance of inner emotions, as human activity, as 
representation by image and by concept" (PLT, p. 193). This 
statement seems ironic, but it is not. Given his remarks about 
the dispensability of the philosophy of language and about its 
being a sham however, the question that it raises is, how can 
such views be correct? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to clarify 
Heidegger's use of the word "correct." In his usage, correctness 
is a possible feature of judgmental assertion. It is a combination 
of representations (or words) in harmony (or agreement) with 
an object of judgment. Correctness therefore has a rightful place 
in the typical theoretical, epistemological practice of 
philosophy of language. And just as there was no quarrel with 
the fact that language lends itself to objectification, there is no 
argument with the fact that "the correct always fixes upon 
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something pertinent in whatever is under consideration" (QT, 
p. 6). 
But, for Heidegger, to say a philosophical assertion is 
correct is not the same as saying it is true: "the merely correct," 
he wrote, "is not yet the true" (QT, p. 6). Whereas correctness 
is a possible feature of judgmental epistemological assertion, 
"truth" in Heidegger's vocabulary concerns, among other things, 
the essence of that about which judgmental assertions are 
made. "Essence" ("Wesen"), however, did not have its usual, 
nominal meaning either. It did not mean the identifying 
characteristics of something already objectively present and 
identified. Rather, "essence" was taken in a verbal sense. 
Uncovering the essence of something meant bringing to sight the 
way or ways it reveals itself, comes to presence, and persists in 
presence. And, as Heidegger put it, "Only at the point where 
such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass [sich 
ereignet]" (QT, p. 6). 
Heidegger's mature reflections on language were oriented 
not toward correct judgments about language as an object but 
toward an uncovering of the essence of language, its truth, i.e., 
the way or ways it reveals itself, comes to presence, and 
persists in presence. But how is such an uncovering to be 
accomplished? To answer this* question, some prefatory 
methodological considerations are in order. 
Despite his abandonment of phenomenology as a "school" 
of philosophy in favor of what he called das wesentliche 
Denken (essential thinking) and his general aversion to 
methodology, there are some respects in which Heidegger 
continued to practice the phenomenological method while 
abandoning many of the idealistic prejudices Husserl thought 
necessary for its deployment. Late in life, Heidegger could still 
write: 
in what is most its own phenomenology is not a 
school. It is the possibility of thinking, at times 
changing and only thus persisting, of corresponding 
to the claim of what is to be thought. (OTB, p. 82) 
Phenomenology as the thinking correspondence to what is to be 
thought is clearly demonstrated in his later essays on language. 
They evolved, at least in part, I believe, out of an aspiration to 
a radical phenomenological thinking experience with 
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language, one that is missing in traditional philosophy of 
language. 
There are at least two essential ingredients of the 
phenomenological method which are detectable, although not 
identified as such, in Heidegger's later essays on language: the 
move "to the things themselves" and a turn from objective, 
conceptual representation and judgment toward undergoing an 
experience (Erfahrung) with language. Together they support 
the contention that his thinking was phenomenological at least 
in spirit. 
Zu der Sachen Selbst, To the things themselves, has been 
the motto of the phenomenological method from its beginning. 
As a thinking that goes to the things themselves, 
phenomenology is precisely not an assault upon them, an 
assault which hands them over to what they themselves are 
not, but rather an open, patient, personal meditation on them. 
Heidegger wrote, "We do not wish to ground language in 
something else that is not language itself, nor do we wish to 
explain other things by means of language" (PLT, p. 191). Thus 
guided by the phenomenological motto, Heidegger 
recommended a return to our immediate personal experience 
with language and attempted to lead the way to where 
language can be seen from itself in the very way it shows itself 
from itself, to where its revealing itself, coming to presence, 
and persisting in presence shows itself. Such a procedure is not 
an intuition, an insight, a glance, or a discerning examination 
cast into an objective domain wherein the nominal, as opposed 
to the verbal, essence of language resides. Heidegger often 
cautioned against reading his own meditations on language as 
about language as an object. They were not intended to present 
knowledge of an object. Even so. 
Whether the attempt to bring us face to face with 
the possibility of such an experience will succeed, 
and if it does, how far that possible success will go for 
each of us~that is not up to any of us. (OWL, p. 59) 
In the case of language, going to the things themselves 
involves, paradoxically, a twofold holding-back. First, it is a 
bracketing (Husserl's word of course) or disengaging of all 
previous theories about language. Heidegger wrote, "To be sure, 
speaking is vocalization. Also, it can be considered a human 
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activity. Both are correct views of language as speaking. Both 
will now be ignored" (OWL, p. 121). Holding-back in this way 
coincides with a turn to language itself and if successful opens 
the way to an unprejudiced experience with it. Second, 
holding-back is self-silencing, which is a cultivating of the 
possibility of undergoing an experience with language as such. 
Such a posture, it is hoped, will eventuate in what Heidegger 
at one time called authentic divination: "Authentic divination 
is the mode in which essentials come to us and so come to mind" 
(WCT, p. 207). 
It is appropriate to ask, what does this twofold holding-
back bring to mind? To answer this question, I shall digress 
somewhat from Heidegger's articulated thought but in a way 
that, I believe, will not violate its spirit and that ends up in 
the same place. 
When we willfully silence ourselves, perhaps the first 
thing we notice is that there persists a silent, spontaneous, 
unsolicited occurrence or self-giving to consciousness of small 
fragments of language of varying degrees of complexity—bits of 
song, a commercial jingle, fragments of a previous or possible 
future conversation, pieces of a paper we are writing or hope to 
write, for example. In this rehearsal, this chaos, resides most 
of the raw material for all sorts and varieties of linguistic 
structures. And no matter how complex or elegant or creative 
the constructions out of this raw material may eventually 
become, they never completely leave behind these silent 
murmurings that are always already going on. Language gives 
itself even in the absence of an intention to communicate. 
Let us now imagine that a need or desire to speak positions 
itself amidst this silent din. At least sometimes the chaos 
there spontaneously becomes orderly and a minor miracle takes 
place: something gets said, uttered, articulated. 
There is no guarantee of course that linguistic order will 
occur out of this silent linguistic chaos. The presence of a 
motivation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
speaking: language may or may not give itself to our need or 
desire to speak at the appropriate time. Speaking is possible 
only by virtue of the self-giving-the showing up, the coming to 
presence, the "speaking"-of language to our need or desire to 
speak. "Human speech," Heidegger wrote, " . . . is not self-
subsistent. The speech of mortals rests in its relation to the 
speaking of language" (PLT, p. 208). 
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The next thing that presents itself in an unprejudiced 
experience with language concerns that which motivates the 
need or desire to speak, that in regard to which the silent chaos 
becomes structured and ordered. The motivation to speak is a 
particular way of being concerned with what shows itself in a 
general realm of self-showing and is conditioned and takes 
shape by what shows itself therein. This is, I take it, what 
Heidegger meant when he wrote, "all signs arise from a 
showing within whose realm and for whose purpose they can be 
signs" (OWL, p. 123. Cf., also, BT, pp. 204-05). Whereas there 
are other ways that things show themselves in the general 
realm of self-showing, the distinguishing feature of speaking 
language is that something capable of being spoken is 
explicitly identified as what it is. Moreover, that which 
speaking exalts from implicit presence to explicit appearance 
retains in itself aspects which do not come to explicit 
appearance in any particular linguistic event. Its being remains 
manifold. Even so, the fact that speaking brings something to 
explicit appearance can be demonstrated by observing that any 
subsequent response to what is spoken-whether is it clear or 
unclear, true or false, well-spoken or ill-spoken, referential or 
expressive, stupid, exaggerated, or what-not-presupposes that 
something is brought to appearance by and within it. But 
speaking can be that by which and within which something 
implicitly present makes an explicit, even if partial, 
appearance only if the language in it gives way or yields or 
surrenders itself to that which is brought to explicit 
appearance. 
Thus a fourfold condition is necessary for a motivation to 
speak to come to fruition: an entity capable of speaking, the 
self-showing of an aspect from a manifold of aspects of 
something which prompts and shapes a motivation to speak, 
the presence of a motivation (a need or desire) to speak, and the 
self-giving, or showing up, of words which bring the relevant 
aspect of something merely present to explicitly identified 
appearance, words which deflect attention from themselves to 
what they show. In the absence of any of these, there is no 
overt linguistic event, nothing is said. 
Heidegger attempted to zero in on the way language comes 
to presence, lends itself to the motivation to speak and to 
whatever is to be spoken, and persists in presence with the 
proposition, "The essential being of language is Saying as 
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Showing." (OWL, p. 123. "Das Wcscnde der Sprache ist die 
Sage als die Zeige" All words emphasized in original.) 
This last quotation must be interpreted in the right spirit. 
Prima facie it seems to contradict a previous quotation ("the 
essential nature of language flatly refuses to express itself in 
words—in the language, that is, in which we make statements 
about language.") and seems to be just another objectification of 
language. But it is neither a contradiction nor strictly an 
objectification. "Essential being" (Wesende) here is not 
nominal; it does not have to do with the whatness of something 
already disclosed. The quotation is not a judgmental-
epistemological assertion. Rather, "essential being" has a 
fully verbal sense. Saying (Sage) refers to language's self-
giving, its coming to presence, to an entity capable of speaking. 
Showing (Zeige) is what it does when it gives itself, namely, 
it, as Heidegger put it, "summons from fall regions of presence] 
whatever is present to appear and to fade" (OWL, p. 124). So 
we can rewrite Heidegger's proposition, "the essential being of 
language is Saying as Showing," thus: in its self-giving, its 
coming to presence, language deflects attention from itself to 
that which it brings to explicitly identified appearance. In 
the immediacy of living linguistic experience, language, even 
when it gives itself, is also self-concealing, self-denying. 
IV. 
In light of this brief review of Heidegger's 
phenomenological attempt to lead the way to an immediate, 
personal, thinking experience with language and our 
extrapolations from it, it is now possible to elicit further 
insights in our attempt to understand his negative opinion of 
philosophy of language. 
First, we have seen that the presence of a motivation—a 
need or desire—to speak is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for an overt linguistic event, that language may or 
may not give itself at the appropriate time to our need or desire 
to speak. This simple observation about our experience 
represents something more fundamental than the judgments 
that language is externalization of something internal, human 
activity, rule-governed form of behavior, mirror of mind, etc., 
because language's already having given itself is the condition 
for the possibility of any such judgments. Only because 
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language at least sometime? gives itself to our motivation to 
speak is it possible ex post facto to make such judgments. 
In particular, the identification of language as a product of 
human activity, while correct, seems rather impatient. Closer 
scrutiny shows that the presumption of the dominance of man 
over language is an inversion of the true relation: "Man," 
Heidegger wrote, "acts as though he were the shaper and 
master of language, while in fact language remains the master 
of man" (PLT, p. 215). He also wrote, "Mortals speak by 
responding to language in a twofold way, receiving and 
replying" (PLT, p. 209). In fact, the relation of dominance of 
language over man can perhaps best be experienced at those 
times when language does not give itself to our intentions to 
speak, when the right words for what we want to say do not 
come at the right time. At such times, according to Heidegger, 
we leave unspoken what we have in mind and, 
without rightly giving it thought, undergo moments 
in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly 
touched us with its essential being. (OWL, p. 59) 
There may of course be attempts to explain physiologically or 
psychologically the inability to find the right words for what 
we want to say: the presence or absence of a particular 
chemical, neurological event, or hormone, a "lapse" of memory 
or a frightening memory, for example. Phenomenologically, 
however, all such explanations are beside the point. What is 
experienced at such times is a refusal of language to give itself 
to our motivation to speak. We may concentrate diligently, but 
there is no guarantee that we will succeed. We can speak only 
when language gives itself to us. Heidegger himself claimed no 
privileged insight into the "mechanism" of the coming to 
presence of language. He asked, "How does the broken stillness 
come to sound in words? How does the broken stillness shape 
the mortal speech that sounds in verses and sentences?" His 
answer was this: 
Assuming that thinking will succeed one day in 
answering these questions, it must be careful not to 
regard utterance, let alone expression, as the 
decisive element of human speech. (PLT, pp. 208-
09) 
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Second, Heidegger's phenomenology of language implies 
that philosophers of language who would base the philosophy 
of language on the philosophy of mind have the essential 
relationship between language and mind reversed. The 
phenomenological logic goes something like this. The self-
showing of what is thinkable must first be identified. 
Identification of that which presences can occur only if 
language gives the words which identify it. Whatever is to be 
thought (not to say imagined, not to say dealt with in praxis) 
therefore necessarily depends on the self-giving of language. 
That is, the self-giving of language is prior to the actuality of 
mind, not—as has often been assumed-the other way around. 
Third, it was said earlier that the extent to which 
language can be captured in a metalanguage depends in part on 
the metalinguistic resources which have been devised for 
speaking about it. In light of the phenomenological fact that 
all speaking is contingent upon language's self-giving, it must be 
concluded that even the metalinguistic resources employed in 
forcing language to speak about itself are themselves given by 
language. Words for talking about language are adaptations of 
words which are already used to talk about something other 
than language. So the metalanguage of the philosophy of 
language, as well as all other sorts of attempts to talk about 
language, is derived from a more original self-giving of 
language, one originating in practical being in the world, where 
something other than language itself is an issue. 
Fourth, a philosophy of language that takes already 
existing languages as a window onto or grip on already 
explicitly appearing things and then preoccupies itself with 
questions of reference is from the start based on a questionable 
assumption about how things in the world come to explicitly 
identified appearance in the first place. Heidegger's position 
was, as we have seen, that it is language that first brings 
something present to explicit appearance. The problem of 
reference therefore can be a problem only after language has 
first brought something to explicit appearance. A philosophy 
of language that takes language as re-presentation of 
something already appearing mistakes what is secondary and 
derivative (the question of reference) for what is primary and 
original. 
64 AUSLEGUNG 
V. 
This study has been governed by a modest ambition, 
namely, to understand and explain Heidegger's negative 
opinion of philosophy of language. His remarks about the 
dispensability of the philosophy of language and its being a 
sham were, it appears, directed mainly against a prevailing 
way of thinking about language in philosophy, one that makes 
language into an object of theoretical interest. They were not 
directed at any particular school of philosophy, but against 
any sort of thinking which can be characterized as an 
objectifying and theoretical approach to language. Linguistics, 
literary critics, psychologists, sociologists, etc., are drawn into 
the bounds of Heidegger's negative opinion insofar as they 
manifest such tendencies. On the other hand, anyone actively 
but non-objectively and non-theoretically engaged with 
language-poets and other literary artists, ordinary speakers, 
and philosophers other than philosophers of language, for 
example-escape them. 
But, as we have seen, Heidegger went on to explore an 
alternative approach, one focusing on the personal experience 
anyone can have with language, one inviting us to pay attention 
to how we experience language ourselves. Such an approach 
radicalized reflection on language and yielded some rather 
unorthodox insights into the man-language relationship. It 
suggested that some of the basic, cherished ideas about the 
relationship typically assumed in the philosophy of language 
are backwards. For this reason alone, many philosophers are 
sure to consider his approach too unorthodox for "hard" 
philosophical studies. Could it not be however that "hard" 
philosophical studies, such as those manifest in contemporary 
philosophy of language, are insecurely grounded? It surely 
wouldn't be the first time in the history of philosophy that a 
radical approach did not share the conventions which have 
become normative. 
It will perhaps have occurred as odd to some that no 
mention has been made here of such relevant Heideggerian 
themes as world and thing, dif-ference. Appropriation, 
expropriation, the question of Being, poetry, the Fourfold, 
time-space, the design of the being of language, etc. But their 
omission is easy to explain. Whereas such issues must be 
necessary ingredients in any systematic account of all 
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Heidegger has said about language, they are not necessary for 
the more modest task of understanding and explaining his 
negative opinion of philosophy of language. For the latter 
purpose, a more selective reading of his works and following up 
on some of their suggestions are all that has been required. 
One significant quotation, written in 1957, has thus far been 
avoided but should now be mentioned: "[T)he scientific and 
philosophical investigation of language and of languages . . . 
has its own particular justification and retains its importance" 
(OWL, p. 59). Sometime between 1952, when he wrote of 
exposing the philosophy of language as a sham, and 1957, 
Heidegger appears to have moderated somewhat his earlier 
negative opinion of philosophy of language. Nowhere did he 
explain what he thought the justification and importance of 
the scientific and philosophical investigation of language and 
of languages are. But it is clear that he was willing to admit 
some sort of justification and importance to them. 
So in the end it cannot be said that Heidegger counseled 
total abandonment of philosophy of language. Perhaps he 
thought that such counsel would surely fall on deaf ears 
anyway, because, he perhaps thought, the objective, 
theoretical, epistemological drive for knowledge about 
language is so ingrained and strong that it cannot be thwarted 
at the present time. So, while recognizing some justification 
and importance in philosophy of language, he was compelled to 
go on and say, "But scientific and philosophical information 
about language is one thing; an experience we undergo with 
language is another" (OWL, p. 59). His phenomenology of 
language sought to bear witness to the fact that, as he put it, 
"Language is a primal phenomenon whose proprium is not 
amenable to factual proof but can be caught sight of only in an 
unprejudiced experience of language" (PT, p. 25). 
In light of the foregoing account we must ask finally what, 
if anything, is the philosopher of language supposed to do? 
One thing might be to immediately forbear the ambition of a 
grand theory that would put all further questions about 
language to rest and spend some time on the questions: How 
does the broken stillness come to sound in words? How does the 
broken stillness shape the mortal speech that sounds in verses 
and sentences? Another might be to wait attentively for the 
appropriation of his or her speech from the silent depths from 
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out of which it is given. Then perhaps he or she can say 
something heretofore unsaid about language. 
Moreover, his phenomenology of language's coming to 
presence strongly suggests humility on the part of the 
philosopher of language and conscientiousness in avoiding 
mistaking how language shows itself and what it shows in any 
particular language at any particular time for the whole truth 
about language itself. It invites us to think: (1) that language 
is first and foremost a gift, something to be cherished and 
protected from debasement, (2) that the decisive fact about 
human speech is not utterance or expression, but rather, the 
appropriating, self-giving of language, (3) that there is always 
more to be said about language as it continues to give itself, (4) 
that as long as language continues to give itself, never can 
everything be said about it, (5) that what we ordinarily take 
as language (speaking) emerges from a place that cannot be 
captured in objectifying statement, (6) that the nature of 
language qualifies as what can be called a mystery, and (7) 
that anything said about language should be taken as no more 
than a wave on the mysterious ocean of language itself. 
